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THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE COM-
MUNITY *
BY WILHELM WUNDT.
While I request your most thoughtful attention to
a brief consideration of the relation of the individual
to the community, I desire above all to emphasise the
fact that it is not the juridical nor even the legal phil-
osophical aspect of this problem, that I purpose to dis-
cuss, however much the)' may crowd into the foreground
at the mention of the theme. It is rather another
point of view, heretofore little observed, that has led
me to this question and for which I should like to
claim your attention. This is the psychological point
of view. In fact, the question, how the individual is
related to the life-communities that surround him, to
the nation, to the state to which he belongs, is cer-
tainly, perhaps I could say in the first degree, a psy-
chological question. For if it is the spiritual nature
of man, upon which his being and the character of his
existence chiefly depend, then that science which has
this spiritual nature as its object, must also give ac-
count, first of all, concerning the nature of the rela-
tions, which, in all forms of human association unite
men with men. Does that nation, which, united by the
same language, customs, and views of life, looks back to
a common history and calls intellectual products of im-
perishable value its own, consist of nothing but the mul-
titude of individuals who belong to it? Or is there some-
thing else added,which first makes possible the qualities
of this community, a spiritual collective power which
cannot be conceived of merely as a sum of particular
effects ? And is the state, in which such a national
community is compacted into a firmly united organ-
isation, nothing but a multiplication of the same com-
binations, as individuals arbitrarily enter into with
each other, at pleasure, for passing purposes ? Or is
it also a unitary, collective being, no less independent
and sui generis than the individual organism ?
It is a spectacle which the history of science fur-
nishes frequently enough, that problems which we
count most difficult in view of the opposition of opin-
ions which exist concerning them, appeared capable
* This is the substance of a lecture delivered as an oration by Professor
Wundt on the birthday festival of the King of Saxony. The oration was pub-
lished in the Deutsche Rundschau.
of easy solution at a remote period which furnished
them with more simple explanations but also under
more simple conditions. More rarely it may happen
that we again to-day, after long circuitous courses, pre-
fer such early discovered solutions to the multitude of
painfully conceived theories that have since asserted
sovereignty, and we prefer them perhaps just because
an investigation begun under more simple hypotheses
might more easily succeed in comprehending the es-
sence of the thing with hasty glance, since the eyes
of those coming later are blurred by the plentitude of
circumstances that have since come to light, or also
by accepted opinions.
The problem that lies before us, belongs as I be-
lieve to those of such a character. That the nature
of human association can be understood only upon the
basis of a comprehensive insight into the spiritual na-
ture of the individual man, and that the qualities of the
individual presuppose, none the less, the community
as its necessary condition, has scarcely ever since been
expressed so excellently and clearly as by that thinker
who presented the collected world and life-views of
antiquity in a complete system that observes all just
claims proportionately,— I mean Aristotle. It is not
to his logic and metaphysics, which in spite of the
long sovereignty which they have asserted, are for us
long since antiquated, that I would like to give prefer-
ence, but to two other writings of this philosopher,
because the fundamental thoughts by which they are
sustained, even to-day, possess for us, with certain
limitations, a living significance. These are the little
treatise concerning the soul, and the most mature work
of his age, " Politics." The two belong together ; for
only the two united give a perfect idea of how the
man, who was a teacher of Alexander the Great in
philosophy as well as statecraft, conceived of the na-
ture of the individual and of the community.
I. THE STATE OF NATURAL GROWTH AND MAN A
POLITICAL BEING.
To be sure, in almost every phase, the disclosures
of the Aristotelian psychology can no longer be our
standard. To desire its restoration would be no less an
anachronism, than if one were to attempt to transplant
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the physical doctrines of Aristotle into the physics of
to-day. But when he points to the indivisible con-
nection of all psychical activities, to the evolution of
the higher from the lower, according to law, to the
inner union of the psychical life with other life pro-
cesses, and above all when he beholds the true spirit-
ual essence of man in the spiritual activities them-
selves, not in some sort of transcendental substance,
in which the psychical phenomena flit by simply as
perishable shadows, foreign to the true essence of
spirit,—these are views, to which, again, to-day psy-
chology returns after long wandering about upon the
uncertain sea of changing metaphysical opinions.
Most of the political doctrines of this philosopher,
indeed, are likewise unfit for restoration. Not merely
is what he says concerning the participation of the clas-
ses in government, concerning the relation of the citizen
to the non citizen and stranger, and of the freeman to
the slave, repugnant to our present feeling of right
and humanity, but also the narrow compass of the an-
cient state, the total lack of those manifold interac-
tions and voluntary combinations of individuals, which
we in the notion of "society" contrast with the po-
litical community, make his discussions inapplicable
for us. Nevertheless his fundamental view of the state
might even to-day appear to very many superior to
all the artificial hypotheses that have since obtained.
Above all, the thought that it is not permissible, to
derive political existence from any past condition in
which the individual has lived apart from any asso-
ciation with his like ; the thought also, that man from
the beginning was a "political being," as well as the
other thought that the state does not exist merely for
the sake of the possession and security of its citizens,
but that it is besides an end in itself, destined to pro-
duce good and beautiful results,—these fundamental
thoughts of the Aristotelian politics, will have now
more prospect of acquiescence than heretofore, since
the knowledge gradually begins to prevail that egoistic
ultilitarian considerations, are a much too insecure
basis upon which to found the noblest impulses of the
human soul.
The ways, indeed, are long and strangely entangled,
that have to-day led us back to views akin to those which
an impartial thinker, independently surveying human
affairs, expressed more than two thousand years ago.
When the civilisation of antiquity became antiquated
and the gospel of the redemption of disconsolate hu-
manity had placed before our eyes an ideal that pre-
sented the strongest contrast to the ideal of life- enjoy-
ing Greece, that antithesis had also to find expression
in views regarding being and the value of the individ-
ual existence and the life-associations to which the in-
dividual belongs. The Christian view of the world,
which esteemed the sensuous life merely as a prepara-
tion for the true life, the supersensuous, was here con-
soled incomparably more than by the Aristotelian doc-
trines or that Platonic conception, which considered
the union of spirit with body as an evil, as an impris-
onment of the soul, from which the latter looked back
with longing to the unsullied purity of its previous in-
corporeal existence. Even, later, when Aristotle had
become the unquestioned leader of mediaeval science,
people accommodated themselves to his doctrine of
the nature of the soul only under reservations that
limited the union of the lower psychical powers with
the bodily organs to the earthly life. Among life com-
munities, however, only one in the eyes of the me-
diaeval church had permanent value ; the community
of believers, who without regard for political limits
realise the Divine state, a representation of the heav-
enly kingdom upon earth. This one community alone,
is of Divine, supernatural origin. All secular states
arose in the natural way. They are founded for per-
ishable purposes, by compacts, which like all secular
compacts can be dissolved when those purposes are
on the point of subversion. The ideal life, however,
is life separate from state organisation. Therefore
man in Paradise, before the fall, lived separate from
state organisation, just as the future life, which will no
longer need the laws and legal ordinances of this world,
will be unconnected with state organisation. World
revolutionising deve-lopments can only be perfected in
violent oppositions. When Christianity overcame the
one-sided idea of happiness of ancient ethics, when it
overcame the limited political conceptions of the civic
institutions of antiquity, finally, when it assured to
the individual personality as such, without regard to
race and class distinction, its claim to moral esteem,
it succeeded only by rendering everything that seemed
good and valuable to the Greeks, as worthless when
compared to the higher goods,. which it taught men
to know. But it has, visibly to all eyes, come to light,
that the negation of real life to which Christian phi-
losophy was thus continually impelled, gradually had
to destroy itself, that, thought out with consistency, it
led necessarily to the opposite of that which it strove
after. This appeared not merely in the secularisation
of the medisEval church, to which it was doomed as if
by fate, but is to be traced also in many other phe-
nomena, which as they belong to the more obscure
development of scientific views, are more wont to es-
cape observation. To these phenomena, belongs also,
as I believe, the remarkable fact that the weapons
forged by ecclesiastical philosophy for the protection
of its transcendental system, when turned against this
system in the following age, transformed themselves
into the most effective instruments for a perfectly sec-
ular, natural view of life.
When, in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.
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the newly prevailing impulse for investigation abol-
ished, in all domains, the remnants of mediaeval scho-
lasticism, when there no longer remained one stone
upon another of the building of Aristotelian Physics
and Metaphysics, then those two essentials of the
ecclesiastical philosophical doctrinal edifice, which re-
late to the anthropological and the sociological problem,
preserved themselves intact, according to their essen-
tial fundamental concepts, in the new era. While
mediaeval metaphysics had regarded the union of spirit
with body, in the sense of the relation of all earthly
things to the supersensuous world, as a transitory im-
prisonment, from which it was the hope of the suffer-
ing soul to be released, this same conception of Aris-
totle's became a welcome tool for the worldly minded
philosophy of the following centuries, to implant an-
thropological concepts in that mechanical view of
the world, which obtained sovereignty under the in-
fluence of the pioneer discoveries in the natural sci-
ences. At this time, the body was esteemed little more
than a prison, involuntaril}' endured by the soul. Nev-
ertheless body and spirit confronted each other as
equall}' real substances, and in the conceptions con-
cerning their interactions, the preponderance lay so
much upon the side of the corporeal event, that there
fell to the soul, at the most, only the role of an atom
of specific inner qualities, which, like the material
elements in which it was bound up, was subjected to
the universal, mechanical conformity—to law. There-
fore, it is comprehensible, that people, from these con-
ceptions came easily to accept the spiritual life as
nothing but a sport of mechanical movements. As
the rise of mechanical physics, soaring above every-
thing as it did, after the beginning of the seventeenth
century, furnished aid to materialistic views, so the
very idea of the transcendentality of the spirit, which
at one time, sprang from the negation of the sensuous
world, offered also to this differently moulded era,
the expedient for satisfying the claims of faith. The
immaterial, immortal soul,— thus a Francis Bacon, a
Pierre Gassendi and many others explained it,—the im-
mortal soul lies outside the pale of cognition : Cogni-
tion has only to do with the sensuous soul, which is
necessarily a sensuous being.
Modern times accepted the inheritance of the me-
diaeval church, in the same manner, in the conceptions
that prevailed concerning the significance of political
institutions. The political powers striving after an in-
dependent unfolding of strength, even in the fourteenth
century, made a vain attempt to resurrect the Platonic
conception that the state was a living being, with or-
ganic members. The German Reformation, at a later
period, in a similar sense, sought in vain to secure rec-
ognition for the precept that the magistracy was es-
tablished by God. The notion that the state was the
result of a compact between men, did not again dis-
appear from science and it soon, victoriously super-
seded all other views. However, there was no longer
any question of opposing a divine state to this human
s'tate, established for perishable purposes. On the
contrary, when Thomas Hobbes developed his idea of
the state church, he boldly claimed the unconditional
subordination of the latter with the cynical words:
"Religion is the belief permitted by the state, super-
stition the belief forbidden." The main principle of
these new theories of the state was to create a legal
basis for the sovereignty of the state, which led back
to no supersensuous origin, but taught men to con-
ceive of the "corpus politicum," as a no less natural
creation than is any natural body that issues from
known natural powers. Thus, the secular theory, in
this respect also, takes possession of the same concep-
tion as the ecclesiastical once did for opposite pur-
poses. For the latter, the state had been a work of
human agreement, in order to subordinate it all the
more certainly to the divine state, which was of su-
pernatural origin. The contract-theory now became
an expedient for insuring the state against all attacks,
just because that only is regarded as legitimate which
is of natural origin.
The logical development of this conception, how-
ever, was obliged gradually to lead far beyond its
aim, in order, finally, to attain a result again annul-
ling it. In the endeavor to establish the primitive
equality of the natural rights of individuals, Hobbes
replaced the early idea of a "contract of subordina-
tion " which was applied to the state on the basis of
the relation of the ruler to the ruled, by that of a
"social contract, " which each concludes with each,
because in the natural condition precedent to the
state, each is dependent upon his own will alone.
Now, as indeed actually happened, this social con-
tract could be adapted to all possible political views.
However, the ideal of an absolute sovereignty of the
people, corresponded to it most perfectly, according to
which the best state's constitution was said to be that
in which each foregoes, in his originally unlimited will
only the minimum which is indispensable for the safety
of all. Here, again, the social contract of a Jean
Jacques Rousseau accorded most beautifully with the
testimony of those Christian philosophers, who es-
teemed the state as a necessary evil and the anarchical
or stateless primitive condition, as the true paradisian
ideal.
Thus, in manifold relations, that mediaeval doc-
trine prolonged its existence up to the threshold of
our century. Wilhelm von Humboldt, in his " At-
tempt to Determine the Limits of State Interference,"
condemned even that activity of the state which seeks
to further the positive well-being of its citizens, as
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deleterious. For it would be the highest ideal of
the collective life of human beings, "if each devel-
oped from himself alone and for his own sake." And
Fichte, a few years later, in his "Lectures Concern-
ing the Vocation of Scholars, " thought that there must,
surely, lie a point somewhere in the prescribed course
of the human race "where all political institutions
will be superfluous," because pure reason will be uni-
versally recognised as supreme arbiter. Only from
that point however, and only when the state has grad-
ually become unnecessary will we, in general be "true
men." Truly, the antithesis to the Aristotelian prin-
ciple, that the state was prior to the individual and that
man is a political being, cannot be more vigorously
expressed.
Yet, in the latter case as well as in the former, the
conception of the community stands in the closest con-
nection with that of the individual man. If good and
truth are, everywhere, only a product of subjective
reason, a commonwealth that binds the wills of indi-
viduals will be experienced only as a galling restraint
that, finally, may be unable to withstand the struggle
after a perfectly free activity of the rational will. Thus,
the bold idealism of the Storm and Stress Period
leads to the same result that the naturalism of the
social theories of the seventeenth century attained.
As for Fichte, the individual reason, so for Hobbes,
the individual body only, possessed a title to inde-
pendent reality. In both cases the commonwealth
becomes a sum of individuals, which, by voluntary
assent, subject themselves to certain rules of action,
for harmonious, subjective purposes.
But the author of the "Addresses to the German
People," (Fichte) had already abandoned much of the
fundamental thoughts of his earlier lectures, as, after
him, likewise the statesman Flumboldt wished no longer
to acknowledge the content of his youthful labors.
There were two intellectual streams, independent of
each other in external appearance, but, at bottom,
sustained, half consciously and half unconsciously, by
the force of national exaltation, in the beginning of
our century, which caused those views to totter.
On the one side, a deeper historical conception of
habits and laws of previous eras, awakened and roused
to independent life by Romanticism, caused the ra-
tionalistic constructions of state and society to appear
in an increasingly more doubtful light. On the other
side, in German philosophy, there issued forth from
the logical progressive development of Fichte's ideas,
the notion of an objective world-rationality, of a spirit
of universality, concerning which people assumed that,
in history, political life and in all ideal creations de-
pending upon the united intellectual labor of mankind,
such as art, religion, and philosophy, it proves its real-
ity, independent and infinitely superior to individual
existence. An age whose distinction from the former
ages consisted, not the least in the fact that it had
learned to think historically, could not escape the
power of this idea, even although the abstruse, dialectic
garment, in which Hegel's system, its most thoroughly
developed presentation had clothed it proved obstruc-
tive to its propagation. But for just this reason, one
cannot regret enough that the logical scheme of that
system established everywhere in the place of real,
historical developments an artificial system of concepts
and that, led astray by this, it split into opposites such
things as according to their essence and origin belonged
together. Thus the domain of objective morality was
here, like another higher world, placed in opposition
to subjective morality. Law and state appeared like
beings sui generis, almost as if they could exist inde-
pendent of individuals. Thus arose the idea of an in-
dependent existence of communities, through which
they were, on the whole, considered too much like in-
dividual beings.
NATURE AND MORALITY.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ETHICAL VIEWS OF JOHN
STUART MILL.
I. THE WEANING OF BASING ETHICS UPON NATURE.
John Stuart Mill has written an essay on Nature
in which he "inquires into the truth of the doctrines
which make Nature a test of right and wrong." He
sums up the results of his inquiry in the following con-
clusions :
" The word Nature has two principal meanings ; it either de-
notes the entire system of things, with the aggregate of all their
properties, or it denotes things as they would be, apart from human
intervention.
" In the first of these senses, the doctrine that man ought to
follow nature is unmeaning ; since man has no power to do any-
thing else than follow nature ; all his actions are done through,
and in obedience to, some one or many of nature's physical or
mental laws.
" In the other sense of the term, the doctrine that man ought
to follow nature, or in other words, ought to make the spontaneous
course of things the model of his voluntary actions, is equally irra-
tional and immoral.
"Irrational, because all human action whatever, consists in
altering, and all useful action in improving, the spontaneous course
of nature :
"Immoral, because the course of natural phenomena being
replete with everything which when committed by human beings
is most worthy of abhorrence, any one who endeavoured in his
actions to imitate the natural course of things would be universally
seen and acknowledged to be the wickedest of men."
If the word Nature is used in the second meaning,
it is obvious that an imitation of nature would signify
the suppression of the human in man, of that which
is properly called ethical ; it would deprive man of his
most characteristic and noblest feature,—rationality
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—and degrade him into an animal blindly obeying its
instincts.
Yet what is instinct but inherited habit? How
have habits been acquired but by repeated action ?
Instinct is by no means bare of the rational element.
Instinct is not totally blind. Although it may not
prove rational intelligence in the individual, yet it
does prove rational intelligence in the race. Instinct
can be explained only as having been acquired through
race-experience. The human has grown out of the
race-experience of man's ancestors, and the rationality
of certain instincts are a prophecy of the human. If
the blindness of instinct has to be called "natural,"
and that element of rationality, however small it may
be, which represents judgment and may be con-
sidered as the germ of humanity is to be counted as
"non-natural," the whole animal kingdom from man
down to the moner must be classed as part of the non-
natural domain of the world. Nature in that case
would have to be limited to the province of unorgan-
ised things, to stones or minerals, and the world of
plants might be a disputed ground.
This conception of nature is not admissible, and it
contradicts its etymological meaning, which is not as
yet forgotten. The word "Nature" is derived from
?!asiere, to grow, and denotes especially the evolution
of organised life.
If we take "nature" in its first meaning, denoting
" the entire system of things with the aggregate of all
the properties," Mr. Mill declares that the doctrine
that "man ought to follow nature " has no meaning.
He says
:
"The scheme of Nature regarded in its whole extent, cannot
have had, for its sole or even principal object, the good of human
or other sentient beings. What good it brings to them, is mostly
the result of their own exertions."
Certainly, that good which nature brings to sen-
tient beings, is mostly the result of their own exertions.
But if nature comprises the entire system of things, it
also includes the exertions of sentient beings. That
sentient beings can make efforts, is one of the most
important, nay, for us it is the all-important part of
nature. In other words, ethics is not something arti-
ficial in contrast to that which is natural, it is not some-
thing non-natural or unnatural ; ethics is the most
characteristic feature of human nature.
Mr. Mill has much to say about art and the arti-
ficial. He treats art as something radically different
from nature. He ought to have remembered Shake-
speare's lines :
" Yet nature is made better by no mean.
But nature makes that mean ; so, over that art,
which, you say, adds to nature, is an art
That nature makes
This is an art
Which does mend nature—change, rather ; but
The art itself is nature \"— Winter's Talc.
Mr. Mill tries to dispel some ambiguities that lurk
in the old proposition naturam seqiii, yet he confines
his investigation to one interpretation of this rule only,
and indeed to that which is the crudest and the most
obviously absurd conception we can form of it, so crude
that nobody has ever maintained it and, so far as I
know, even thought of it before Mr. Mill refuted its
proposition.
*
* *
In the introductory remarks to his essay on Na-
ture, Mr. Mill complains about the "many meanings,
different from the primary one, yet sufficiently allied
to it to admit of confusion." The article was appar-
ently suggested by the reading of certain propositions
of theological authors, who maintain that nature must
be considered as a divine revelation ; nature's doings are
acts of God; the scheme of nature indicates a plan
wisely premeditated and designed to serve the good
of human or of other sentient beings; and that "all
things are for wise and good ends. Such a view has
been presented to "exalt instinct at the expense of
reason."
Mr. Mill deals with these notions with great adroit-
ness. He refutes the idea that natural processes are
an indication of the Creator's designs. Natural laws
act blindly; the storm rages without taking into con-
sideration that it may do harm to sentient beings.
Now, if we consider nature as a personal being who
acts not in uniformities of law, but with conscious
knowledge of the consequences of his doings, and ad-
justing them to special ends, it would truly be ridic-
ulous to say that we must act as indeliberately, ruth-
lessly, and blindly, as nature acts. Mr. Mill has
succeeded completely in the refutation of this view,
although it almost appears to me that a serious refu-
tation is scarcely necessary.
The following passage might be suspected of hu-
mor, but Mr. Mill is in deep earnest.
He says :
'
' In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged
or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's every day
performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognised by hu-
man laws. Nature does once to every being that lives ; and in a
large proportion of cases, after protracted tortures such as only
the greatest monsters whom we read of ever purposely inflicted on
their living fellow-creatures.
" Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts
them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes
them with stones like the first christian martyr, starv-es them with
hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or
slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous
deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a
Domitian never surpassed. All this, Nature does with the most
supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice, emptying her
shafts upon the best and noblest indifferently with the meanest
and worst ; upon those who are engaged in the highest and wor-
thiest enterprises, and often as the direct consequence of the no*
blest acts ; and it might almost be imagined as a punishment for
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them. She mows down those on whose existence hangs the well-
being of a whole people, perhaps the prospects of the human race
for generations to come, with as little compunction as those whose
death is a relief to themselves, or a blessing to those under their
noxious influence. Such are Nature's dealings with life. Next to
taking life (equal to it according to a high authority) is taking the
means by which we live ; and Nature does this too on the largest
scale and with the most callous indiiTerence. A single hurricane
destroys the hopes of a season ; a flight of locusts, or an inunda-
tion, desolates a district ; a trifling chemical change in an edible
root, starves a million of people. The waves of the sea, like ban-
ditti seize and appropriate the wealth of the rich and the little all
of the poor with the same accompaniments of stripping, wound-
ing, and killing as their human antitypes. Everything in short,
which the worst men commit either against life or property is
perpetrated on a larger scale by natural agents.
" Nature has Noyades more fatal than those of Carrier ; her
explosions of fire damp are as destructive as human artillery ; her
plague and cholera far surpass the poison cups of the Borgias.
Even the love of ' order ' which is thought to be a following of the
ways of Nature, is in fact a contradiction of them. All which
people are accustomed to deprecate as ' disorder ' and its conse-
quences, is precisely a counterpart of Nature's ways. Anarchy
and the Reign of Terror are overmatched in injustice, ruin, and
death, by a hurricane and a pestilence."
The passage quoted appears to me of special in-
terest because the anthropomorphic view of nature is
pushed to its utmost extreme. Mr. Mill combats here the
conception of a personification of nature which is un-
equalled in mythology. Mr. Mill concludes from his
considerations :
" Nature cannot be a proper model for us to imitate. Either
it is right that we should kill because nature kills ; torture because
nature tortures
; ruin and devastate because nature does the like ;
or we ought not to consider at all what nature does, but what it is
good to do. If there is such a thing as a rcduclio ad absurduiit,
this surely amounts to one. If it is a sufficient reason for doing
one thing, that nature does it, why not another thing ? If not all
things, why anything ? The physical government of the world
being full of the things which when done by men are deemed the
greatest enormities, it cannot be religious or moral in us to guide
our actions by the analogy of the course of nature."
Mr. Mill apparently takes the words naturam sequi
in the sense of natin'am imitari. To follow nature is
in his conception not a conforming to the entire system
of things and its laws, but the regarding the facts of
nature as the actions of a person, and acting accord-
ingly.
If "nature" is taken in the sense of the whole
system of things, the precept to follow nature, Mr.
Mill says, is, with reference to the irrefragable neces-
sity of natural laws, meaningless. For every atom
—
so to say—obeys the law of gravitation, and every mo-
tive sufficiently strong to incite a man to action, if not
counteracted by other and equally strong motives, will
pass into an act; it will—so to say—obey the laws of
psychical^ dynamics. Any advice to obey the laws of
nature in this sense is not quite as ridiculous as the
injunction to imitate nature, but it is meaningless. It
makes no sense.
But there is another sense still—and Mr. Mill has
not overlooked it—in which the doctrine of basing
ethics upon nature can be conceived. Mr. Mill, it
appears, has devoted little space to an explanation of
it, because to his mind it seemed so very obvious and
unquestionably correct. Indeed it is as unquestion-
ably correct as the other views which he combats are
unquestionably erroneous and meaningless.
The original definition of nature is formulated by
Mill as follows :
"As the nature of any given thing is the aggregate of its
powers and properties, so Nature in the abstract is the aggregate
of the powers and properties of all things.
" Nature means the sum of all phenomena, together with the
causes which produce them ; including not only all that happens,
but all that is capable of happening ; the unused capabilities of
causes being as much a part of the idea of Nature, as those which
take effect."
Mr. Mill concludes :
" Since all phenomena which have been sufficiently examined
are found to take place with regularity, each having certain fixed
conditions .... on the occurrence of which it invariably happens
;
mankind have been able to ascertain, either by direct observation
or by reasoning processes grounded on it, the conditions of the oc-
currence of many phenomena ; and the progress of science mainly
consists in ascertaining those conditions."
Mr. Mill proposes to express the doctrine not by
naturam sequi but by naturam observare. He says
:
'
' To acquire knowledge of the properties of things, and make
use of the knowledge for guidance, is a rule of prudence, for the
adaptation of means to ends ; for giving effect to our wishes and
intentions whatever they may be.
"If, therefore, the useless precept to follow nature were
changed into a precept to study nature ; to know and take heed of
the properties of the things we have to deal with, so far as these
properties are capable of forwarding or obstructing any given pur-
pose ; we should have arrived at the first principle of all intelligent
action, or rather at the definition of intelligent action itself."
The ancients, Mr. Mill says, were very unequivocal
in basing their ethics upon nature. "The Roman
jurists, when attempting to systematise jurisprudence
place in the front of their exposition a certain Jus
natiirale, ' quod natura ' as Justinian declares in the
Institutes, ' omnia animalia docuit.' " Mr. Mill after
alluding to Christianity, continues :
"The people of this generation do not commonly apply prin-
ciples with any such studious exactness [as the ancients], nor own
such binding allegiance to any standard, but live in a kind of con-
fusion of many standards ; a condition not propitious to the for-
mation of steady moral convictions, but convenient enough to
those whose moral opinions sit lightly on them, since it gives them
a much wider range of arguments for defending the doctrine of the
moment."
This is very true. But how can we improve the
present state of ethics, otherwise than by being exact
and trying to find out the leading principle of ethics.
A leading principle of ethics, which may serve us as a
standard for the rules of action and a test for right or
wrong, cannot be artificially constructed. The facts
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upon which moral aspirations have to be based, are
just as much facts of nature as the formation of crys-
tals or the growth of plants. The conditions under
which those facts are formed can be ascertained ; and
we can by observation and forethought predefine their
consequences. They can be described in laws that
are just as immutable as the laws which concern the
growth of plants or the health of the body. Morality
in all its phases and possibilities is deeply founded in
the nature of things, and unless morality be an unex-
plainable fact in contradiction to all other facts of na-
ture—there is but one way of comprehending morality
and discovering its principle. This way is to study
the facts of social life, the consequences of what is
called immorality and the consequences of moral
aspiration, to analyse them, to observe them in their
origin and further development, to understand their
importance, and to formulate their operation as exact
natural laws.
The principle of morality cannot be contrived ; it
must be discovered. It cannot be devised like a work
of art, but has to be found out not otherwise than any
other natural law. Principles of art might be fashioned
so as to suit our imagination—not so principles of
morality. Artistic taste, yet even that in a certain sense
only, is arbitrary, but the principles of morality are
not arbitrary ; they are not a product of our fancy, to
suit special inherited or acquired inclinations, be they
ever, so lofty, charitable, altruistic, generous, or self-
sacrificing. The principles of morality are to be based
upon rigid truths which must be ascertained by ex-
perience and demonstrated by the usual scientific
methods.
There is no choice left ; but we have to base ethics
upon nature.
[TO BE CONTINUED.]
k
CURRENT TOPICS.
The practice of giving a dead congressman a roaring wake is
again exciting comment. Dead statesmen have become so expen-
sive that the people desire not the death of a congressman, but
rather that he be converted and live. It costs so much to bury
him. The funeral bill of a congressman depends apparently upon
what state he hails from, as the figures vary from a few hundreds
up to several thousands of dollars per head. The undertaker's bill
for burying the late Mr. Houk, a member from Tennessee, amounts
to $1,994.90, but this does not include the expenses proper of the
wake itself. These are in addition to the undertaker's bill. The
price of the coffin alone was $1,200, not including the "trimmings"
which cost $200 more. True, it appears in the bill as a " burial
casket," but it was nothing but a coffin after all. When a man is
buried at the expense of his own family it is of course a private
matter with which the outside world has nothing whatever to do ;
but when he is buried by public generosity, a $1,200 "casket" is
an illegal perquisite, and a. post mortem vanity setting a bad exam-
ple. There also appears to be some invidious distinctions made
between the members, for it is remarked that the undertaker's bill
for burying the late Mr. Ford, a member from another state,
amounted to only about $500, and the report ironically says, " In-
stead of a $1,200 casket, Mr. Ford rests in a $150 coffin." Mr.
Ford may rest fairly well in a $150 coffin, but not so laxuriously
as Mr, Houk reposes in a $1,200 casket, decorated and adorned
with $200 worth of trimmings. Petty payments made out of the
public money by legislators for the benefit of each other weaken
the moral sense, and end in the squandering of millions. Tailors'
bills and undertakers' bills are alike private affairs, and congress
has no legal right to pay either of them out of the national treasury.
It is not surprising that undertakers charge exorbitant rates
for burying congressmen, when the committees in charge of the
funeral set them the example. When a member of congress dies
the custom is to appoint six members of the House and three sena-
tors to escort the body home ; and this pious duty often takes the
form of extravagant self-indulgence. A few years ago, a member
from Kansas died in Washington, and the usual funeral committee
was appointed. Their bill for taking him to his home and burying
him amounted to $3,561. This great e-.pense could not have been
made except by indulgence in the most costly wines, liquors, and
cigars ; and by their help the funeral was converted into a " wake "
coarse, lavish, loud. It appears by the vouchers that the commit-
tee fortified themselves for their journey, and tempered their grief
by a "lunch," at the moderate cost of $200. As we have a right
to assume that they had something to eat at their own homes in
Washington, why did they need a $200 lunch before starting on
their journey ? And what sort of a lunch fiend is it that can de-
vour twenty dollars worth of lunch at one effort ? Nine or ten
men cannot eat $200 worth of lunch at one trial. They may drink
it, but even then each man of them must consume two or three
quarts of the most expensive champagne ; and this is enough to
make any one drunk except a congressman. By the time they
reached Harrisburg, the disconsolate mourners were in such a
state of sorrow and starvation that it became necessary to strengthen
and stimulate them with a $200 breakfast. By careful nursing
and proper nourishment of this kind, they managed to reach Kansas
and get back to Washington at the cost of $3,561. All the funeral
expenses that were dignified and respectable probably cost about
$561,—the other $3,000 represented luxury, jollity, and drink.
In a highly colored sketch of Mr. Spurgeon, somewhat partial
by reason of private friendship, the Review of Rexrie-us for March,
confirms what I said a few weeks ago about the collossal faith of
that celebrated preacher. According to his religion, belief was the
key of heaven ; not belief in reasonable things, for there is no re-
ligious merit in that, but belief in the impossible, and in the Sa-
cred History of that which never happened. In his theology the
soul's danger lay just behind the forehead, and therefore the
smaller the facial angle the larger the chance for heaven. He be-
lieved, says the Review of Reviews, ' ' that the whole revelation of
the Divine Will was contained in the canonical books of the Old
and New Testaments, in the verbal inspiration of which, from the
first chapter of Genesis to the last chapter of Revelations, he
never ceased to believe." The leaves of Nature's Book of Revela-
tion, the geologic strata were all heretics to him, for they con-
tained the testimony of the rocks, physical revelations uncorrupted
by interpolation or forgery. He warned his church against the
pagan story of the stars, for Astronomy was the science of Lucifer.
He was impatient of mental development especially among the
Baptists, although they greatly needed it ; and, says the Review of
Reviews. ' ' he protested with such vehemence as he possessed—and
that was not small—he denounced, he thundered, he almost ex-
communicated those of his brethren who could not share his con-
viction that no one could really believe in God the Father and
Christ the son who was not certain that the majority of the human
race were created to pass a whole e'ernity in endless torment." As
the vision of hell faded from human eyes, the despair of Spurgeon
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grew. As light fell upon other men, darkness fell upon him. With
fear and trembling he saw Faith diminish, and Hope and Charity
increase. His friend and biographer says, "He roundly assailed
the tendency of the present time to take a broader view of the fate
of man and the love of God ; and his last years were saddened and
darkened by what he regarded as the apostasy of English Chris-
tianity."
* *
It is only fair and generous to pay a tribute of admiration to
a brave man fighting against the stars in their courses, as the stars
in their courses fought against Sisera ; and therefore I give sym-
pathy to Spurgeon wrestling against the sunshine, and challenging
the very learning and temper of his time. He made a stubborn
fight for his doctrine, but he found that not only were the mental
powers of the world arrayed against him, but the spiritual and
moral forces too. He did not know that these were all one in es-
sence and in substance, and that they rose and fell in sympathy
together. The soul is not weakened by strengthening the mind,
for as the world grows wiser it grows better, and as men become
better they cherish a better opinion of Gdd. Even the Baptists
have grown wise enough and good enough to btlieve and hope that
the "fallen angels" will rise again ; and it appears even by the
Calvinistic census that the population of the bottomless pit is
growing smaller day by day, and the sulphurous cavern will soon
be empty. With a touch of pathos, the Kdvie-a 0/ Revie-ivs thus
explains the defeat of Spurgeon. " He who had proved himself a
very Hercules, who had successfully accomplished all those labors
imposed upon him by a kindly providence, nevertheless found
himself baffled and confounded by the subtle Zeitgeist or spirit of
his time, with which he waged an uncompromising warfare."
Yes, but unfortunately for Mr. Spurgeon "the subtle Zeitgeist"
wages an uncompromising warfare too ; and in a contest with him
the mythological Hercules and the theological Samson both go
down. M. M. Trumbull.
BOOK REVIEWS.
Methods of Instruction and Organisation in the German
Schools. By John T. Prince. Boston : Lee & Shepard.
Dr. John T. Prince has made a very careful study of the Ger-
man school system and presents in a most convenient form within
the small compass of 237 pages all its most characteristic and most
important features. The reviewer of the book has been trained
in German schools and was for several years in active service as a
teacher in Germany ; he feels confident that he is as well informed
on the subject as anyone can be ; so he believes that his opinion
has some weight when saying that Dr. Prince's report is in every
respect accurate. But it is more ; it is judicious. The author
notices the drawbacks as well as the virtues of the German schools
and exaggerates neither the one nor the other. He wants the Amer-
ican teacher to learn from the German educational methods, but
he is far from demanding their direct imitation. The concluding
chapter states the author's opinion in the following words :
" I have said that our schools are poor in comparison with the
"schools of Germany. And yet, I believe I am not inconsistent
"in saying that the best we have are better for us than the best
" that exist in Germany would be."
NOTES.
The Truthseeker Co. (28 Lafayette Place, Yew York City)
have again collected their illustrations of the last year in a hand-
somely bound volume, entitled " Old Testament Stories Comically
Illustrated by Watson Heston." Their plan is to propagate free-
thought by ridiculing the superstitions and errors of religion, but
they are not careful as to whom or what they strike. They are
as vigorous in their work as are the most fanatic believers on the
other side. We do not approve of this method of the Truthseeker
Co.; they spread in this way a wrong kind of freethought and we
believe ihat they will make but few converts by their grotesque
pictures It will make the iconoclast laugh, but the believer will
turn from them with disgust. In the general household of human
thought, iconoclasts of this kind seem to equilibrate the balance
with those eccentric forms of piety which find an expression in the
Salvation Army and similar institutions. So long as the one ex-
treme exists, the other extreme has also right to existence, and
there seem to be deeper causes that demand that it should exist
too.
The A'eiu England Magazine for March contains an article
which will be interesting to all Americans. It is entitled "Rec-
ollections of Louisa May Alcott," the author of " Little Women,''
and is written by Maria S. Porter. The article is preceded by a
beautiful frontispiece engraving of Miss Alcott, taken from a por-
trait made at the age of twenty, and contains besides a number of
reproductions of later photographs handsome cuts of the Alcott
homes. Every one will find in these "recollections" pleasant and
welcome glimpses of the life of a woman whose fame rests as much
on her private virtues as on any of her literary achievements.
MR. C. S. PEIRCE has resumed his lessons by correspondence in the
Art of Reasoning, taught in progressive exercises. A special course in logic
has been prepared for correspondents interested in philosophy. Terras, 830
for twenty-four lessons. Address : Mr. C. S. Peirce, "Avisbe," Milford, Pa.
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